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REAL PROPERTY ACrIONS AND PROC EDINGS LAW

RPAPL 735: Court lacks jurisdiction to render judgment for rent
where tenant was not in default under CPLR 308(2).
The Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law provides for recovery of a judgment for both rent and possession in a summary proceeding. 204 While a proceeding to recover possession is essentially in
rem, a court requires in personam jurisdiction to render a money judgment for rent arrears. 205 When substituted service is effected under
RPAPL 735 by delivery to a person of suitable age and discretion
living or employed at the property to be recovered, 20 6 in personam jurisdiction may be lacking if the respondent defaults. 20 7 This situation
arose in FairhavenApts. No. 6, Inc. v. Dolan.2*8
In Fairhaven, a landlord seeking possession and a judgment for
rent arrears commenced a summary proceeding by serving a petition
and notice of petition on a person of suitable age and discretion at the
property to be recovered. The respondent defaulted on the return date
of the petition, which was set"at nine days after its filing. In concluding
that there was a "basic lack of jurisdiction" to obtain a money judgment, the Suffolk County District Court looked to CPLR 308(2), which
permits such substituted service on a person of suitable age and dis.
cretion, but provides that service is not complete until ten days after
filing.209 The court held that while service on the respondent complied
with CPLR 308(2), she was not in default thereunder because the petition was made returnable in only nine days. The court also held that
recovery of a judgment for rent was barred by the petitioner's failure
to include in the notice of petition a statement, required by court rule
in cases of substituted service,2 10 that the respondent would have 30
days after proof of service in which to answer.211
The rationale of the Fairhavenholding is that in personam juris204 RPAPL 747(4).
205 See, e.g., Wayside Homes, Inc. v. Upton, 40 Misc. 2d 1087, 244 N.Y.S.2d 624 (Dist.
Ct. Nassau County 1968), discussed in The Biannual Survey, 38 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 406, 453

(1964).
206 RPAPL 735 also permits substituted service by affxing a copy of the notice and
petition on the property sought to be recovered. It imposes the additional requirement in
such cases of mailing the notice of petition and petition to the respondent within one day
of the delivery or affixation. Service is complete upon filing proof of service with the court

within three days of the mailing.
207 See Wayside Homes, Inc. v. Upton, 40 Misc. 2d 1087, 244 N.YS.2d 624 (Dist. Ct.
Nassau County 1963).
208 72 Misc. 2d 590, 339 N.Y.S.2d 787 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1972).
209 Id. at 592, 839 N.Y S2d at 789. Proof of service must be filed within 20 days.

210 22 NYCRR 3935.3.
21 72 Misc. 2d at 592, 339 N.Y.S.2d at 789.

SURVEY OF N.Y. PRACTICE
diction should be no easier to acquire under the RPAPL than under
the CPLR. The court's opinion suggests, however, that where substituted service under RPAPL 735 conforms with CPLR 308(2), a
money judgment may be recovered despite the absence of personal
delivery of process to the respondent.212
DOLE V. Dow CHEMICAL Co.

Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: Recent developments.
On March 22, 1972, the Court of Appeals decided Dole v. Dow
Chemical Co.,218 thereby abolishing the active-passive test for indemnification and establishing a system of equitable apportionment of damages among joint tortfeasors. The question of its retroactivity was
presented in two recent cases.
In Hain v. Hewlett Arcade, Inc.,214 a property owner impleaded

the contractor which allegedly created the negligent condition that
injured the plaintiff. On March 21, 1972, the Supreme Court, Nassau
County, directed a verdict against the third-party defendant after the
primary action had been settled. The Appellate Division, Second
Department, upheld this procedure subject to proof by a third-party
plaintiff of the reasonableness of the settlement and liability to the
plaintiff permitting recovery over.215 The court, however, remanded
the case for a determination of the relative responsibilities of the tort212 Cf. 1405 Realty Corp. v. Napier, 68 Misc. 2d 793, 328 N.Y.S2d 44 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Bronx County 1971). discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 47 ST. JoHN's L. R v. 148, 184
(1972) (implying that rent may be recovered in a summary proceeding if service fulfills the
requirements of CPLR 308(4)). But see Leven v. Browne's Business School, Inc., 71 Misc.
2d 842, 843, 337 N.Y.S.2d 307, 309 (Dist. Ct. Nassau County 1972) (dictum), discussed in
The QuarterlySurvey, 47 ST. JoHN's L Rzv. 580, 606 (1973) (rent is recoverable only where
process is personally delivered to respondent).
218 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972), noted in 37 ALBANY L
REV. 154 (1972); 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 815 (1972); 47 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 185 (1972). For an extended discussion of Dole by Professor David D. Siegel, see 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR 3019,
supp. commentary at 205-38 (1972).
214 40 App. Div. 2d 991, 338 N.YS.2d 791 (2d Dep't 1972) (mem.).
215 Id., 338 N.YS.2d at 793, citing Colonial Motor Coach Corp. v. New York Cent.
R.R., 131 Misc. 891, 228 N.Y.S. 508 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson County 1928). The third-party defendant in Hain did not challenge the reasonableness of the settlement.
In Michelucci v. Bennett, 71 Misc. 2d 347, 335 N.YS.2d 967 (Sup. Ct. Washington
County 1972), the court allowed the defendant to implead two former co-defendants with
whom the plaintiff had settled, since the defendant had not been a party to the release.
The question of credit for the settlement payment was not reached. Accord, Williams v.
Town of Niskayuna, 72 Misc. 2d 441, 339 N.YS.2d 888 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1972)
(also rejecting argument that plaintiff was entitled to recover only for defendant's proportionate liability after settling with third-party defendant). Cf. Vassar v. Jackson, 72 Misc.
2d 652, 340 N.YS.2d 151 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1973) (1970 general release executed
by defendant in favor of plaintiff-driver barred counterclaim for indemnity as to co-plaintiff-passenger's cause of action).

